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I. Introduction
Procedures for testing the rational expectations hypothesis desetve careful study because rationality of expectations has such important implications for macroeconomic modeling and policy analysis.' Rationality of expectations generally imposes cross-equation restrictions. 2 In this paper we discuss the implementation and analyze the econometric properties of a particular test of such restrictions. This test has been used in recent empirical studies of bond market behavior. 3 Since the test focuses on the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated movements in variables (as in Barra (1977 Barra ( , 1978 ), it is applicable to many macroeconomic issues. Indeed, the results of this paper are useful in further work (Abel and Mishkin (1983) ) that clarifies the relations among tests of (I) rationality and market efficiency, (2) the short-run neutrality of anticipated policy and (3) Granger (1969) causality in macroeconometric models.
Two important questions about the test of cross-equation restrictions arise naturally. First, under what conditions will the test lead to correct inference about the rationality of expectations? Second, what is the relation of this cross-equation test to the more common singleequation test of market efficiency frequently used in the literature? The answers to these questions are provided by the theorem in section II which states the asymptotic equivalence of the cross-equation test with the more common test of market efficiency. Also in section II we discuss identification and demonstrate that we can test [ 318 1 for rationality of expectations even if some parameters are not identified. Finally, we present an empirical example in section III and concluding remarks in section IV.
II. Tests of Rationality and Market Efficiency
Let R, denote the return from holding a particular security from the end of period t -I to the end of period t, and let cf>,_ 1 denote the set of information available at the end of period t -I. Rationality of expectations, or equivalently, capital market efficiency, implies that the subjective expectation of R, assessed by the market is equal to the objective expectation conditional on past available information, cp, _ 1:
where Em( R ,lcf>,_ 1 ) is the subjective expectation assessed by the market. A slightly weaker condition 4 is used in empirical applications,
where y, = R,-Em (R,Icf>,_,) .
In order to give (2) empirical content, we must specify a model of market equilibrium which determines Em ( R,lcf>,_ 1 ) . The reader is referred to section III for an example and to Fama (1976) for further discussion of various models of market equilibrium used to determine Em( R,lcf>,_ 1 ) in empirical work. Tests of (2) are tests of the joint hypothesis of market efficiency (rational expectations) and that the model of market equilibrium is correctly specified in computing y,. For expositional convenience we refer to this joint hypothesis as "the efficient markets model."
Since equation (2) implies that y, should be uncorrelated with any available information in cp,_ 1 , market efficiency is commonly tested by testing the null hypothesis that a = 0 in the equation below:
4 To see that (2) is weaker than (I), consider the case in which the market's subjective expectation is equal to the objective expectation plus an unforecastable observation error, that is, 
where €;' is a scalar disturbance with the property E(€;'1</>,_ 1) = 0, X, is a k-element row vector containing variables relevant to the pricing of the security at timet, and f3 is a k X I vector of coefficients. As is evident in (4), only unanticipated changes in X, can be correlated withy,.
Suppose that the linear model for the k variables in X can be written as (5) where y is a h X k matrix of coefficients and u, is a k-element row vector of disturbances. Suppose, for the moment, that E(u,l<f>,_ 1) 
where y = y*. and£( €,1</>, _ 1 ) = 0. 5 The system in (5) and (6) can be stacked into one regression system with n ( k + I) observations, and estimated by non-linear least squares. 6 The cross-equation constraints implied by market efficiency, y = y*, can then be tested with a likelihood ratio test. Two questions arise as to the econometric properties of this test. First, can this test be used for valid inference if Z, .. 1 excludes variables relevant to forecasting the variables in X,? Second, what is the relation of this test to the common test for market efficiency using equation (3)? The following theorem provides answers to these related questions.
THEOREM:

The like/ihr)()d ratio ( LR) test of the null h)•pothesis y = y* in (5) and (6) is asymptotical(v equivalent to an F-test of the null hJpothesis a = 0 in (3).
Proof: Observe that the system in (5) and (6) can be rewritten as
5 If E(( X,-Em( X,l</>1 _ 1 ))l<l>r 1) = 0 (which corresponds to the weaker definition of rationality in (2)), then Em( X11<f>,_ 1 ) = Z, 1y + £7* where£( £7*1</>, 1 ) = 0. Therefore £1 = £7 -£7*/3 and E(£ 1 I.P1 . 1 ) = 0.
6 For a detailed description of the estimation procedure, see Mishkin (1983). where 8 = ( y -y*)/3. The null hypothesis y = y* will be true only if 8 = 0. 7
The parameters y and 8 can each be estimated using Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions technique since the disturbances u 1 and u 1 /3 + € 1 are each uncorrelated with Z 1 _ 1 • Although the disturbances are correlated across equations, Zellner's technique reduces to equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) since the right-hand-side variables are identical in all equations. Therefore, the estimate of 8 in (7) is numerically identical to the OLS estimate of a in (3). Thus, an LR test of y = y* is asymptotically equivalent to an F-test of a= 0. 8 We now tum to identification and estimation of the remaining parameters: f3 and the covariance matrix of
be the contemporaneous covariance matrix of u 1 and € 1
where auu is a k X k matrix, au, is a k X l vector and a ..
is a scalar. Therefore, the covariance matrix of the disturbances u 1 and u 1 f3
Let the sample contemporaneous covariance matrix of the residuals from the estimated system in (7) be
where Sxx is a k X k matrix, Sx,. is a k X I vector and Sn is a scalar. Using S as our estimate of Q we obtain
where a circumflex denotes the estimate of a parameter.
The estimate of auu is obtained directly from (II).
However, without further a priori restrictions, the parameters /3, au, and a .. are not identified. Equations (12) and (13) contain 2k + I parameters to be estimated and only k + I equations. Thus, k additional restrictions are required for identification. For example.
7 Note that () = 0 does not imply that y = y* since f3 could be equal to zero. However, if f3 is equal to zero, the parameter y* is not identified and hence y = y* is not testable. Also, in the case in which k > I so that f3 is not a scalar, () could equal zero even if {3 "" 0 and y "" y* In this case, the test of () = 0 could fail to detect a violation of y = y* even asymptotically. See section V of Abel and Mishkin (1983) for further discussion of this point. 8 The tests are only asymptotically equivalent because of differences in degrees of freedom. See footnote 12.
if the covariance vector au, is known, then f3 and a" can be estimated from (12) and (13).
The null hypothesis 8 = 0 in (7) can be tested with a likelihood ratio test with h degrees of freedom. An asymptotically equivalent alternative to the likelihood ratio test is a Wald test based on the statistic ( 14) where V( 0) is the variance of 0. Under the null hypothesis, Q is distributed asymptotically as chi squared with h degrees of freedom. Since the estimate of 8 can be obtained from an OLS regression of y on Z, it can be easily shown that
Recall from (13) that Srr provides an estimate of the scalar f3'auuf3 + 2f3'au, + aw 9 Therefore, we estimate Q in (14) by
Except for the adjustment for degrees of freedom, the test statistic in (16) is the same as the test statistic for the null hypothesis a = 0 in (3). 10 There are cases in which we might be interested in the coefficient estimates of the efficient markets model in (7) in order to study the effects of unanticipated movements in X on the variable y or to explore the source of rejections of market efficiency (rationality). 11 In order to estimate f3 consistently, we need to impose some identifying restrictions on the covariance vector au,. If we assume that au, = 0, then it is particularly easy to estimate the constrained version ( 8 = 0) of the system in (7) by non-linear weighted least squares in which the residual sums of squares are weighted by the inverse of 9 Observe that the unidentifiability of {3, au, and a" does not prevent estimation of the scalar v 2 ~ (f3'auuf3 + 2f3 'au, +a") which is used in the test for the significance of B.
10 Using a standard regression package. S,.,. would be calculated as e'ej(n-:-h) rather than e'ejn, where e is the vector of residuals y -ZB. Of course, this differ~nce disappears asymptotically. Note, however, that although() may be obtained froll} a regression of r on Z and (X-Zy), the test statistics on() using this regression are inconsistent because the residuals from this regression, denoted by i., yield an inconsistent estimate of Recall that market efficiency, as described by equation (2), implies that Yr is uncorrelated with any linear combination of available past information. Therefore, the common test of market efficiency has the desirable property that, except for a chance, a rejection of the null hypothesis can only occur if the market is not efficient, regardless of what available information is included in Z. However, a failure to reject the null hypothesis, even asymptotically, does not rule out market inefficiency. 13 Because we have shown that the common test is asymptotically equivalent to the test of the cross-equation constraints in (5) and (6), it follows that the cross-equation test can also be used for inference under quite general conditions. That is, for any choice of the available information in Z1 . I and for any value of au<' a 12 Since S Xr wilj equal zero, the estimated variance-covariance matrix for () will be calculated by a non-linear least squares program as
where a 2 is the square of the standard error of the non-linear regression and is estimated as the total sum of squares divided by the degrees of freedom for this regression. Because of the weighting of each equation by 1/ ..jSSR,, the total sum of squares of the non-linear regression equals the number of stacked equations, i.e., k + I, while the degrees of freedom
(n-h)-k] and the test statistic will be Q ~ ()'Z'ZBjw where
Since i J will be th~ sam~ as that estimatec;l in a reg~;ession of y on Z and since f3'u'uf3 + i.'i. ~ (y-ZB) '(y-ZB) , the test statistic Q is asymptotically equivalent to the test statistic of the null hypothesis a ~ 0 in (3). 13 See section II of Abel and Mishkin ( 1983) for a discussion of this point. rejection of the null hypothesis is a rejection of market efficiency.
III. An Empirical Example
An empirical example from Mishkin (1981b) will illustrate how the tests of market efficiency discussed in the previous section can be conducted. Using bond price data, we conduct a test of the rationality of short-term interest rate forecasts similar to the test with survey data by Friedman (1980) . 14 Consider the following efficient markets model:
r, = 90 day Treasury bill rate at a quarterly rate BREI;= quarterly return from holding a long-term bond.
The equilibrium return, E,(y,l</> 1 _ 1 ), is assumed to equal the expected return on a 90 day bill (which is r, _ 1 , the bill rate at the end of the quarter t -1 ), plus a constant liquidity premium, d. Note that in terms of the notation of the previous section, r, corresponds to X" the lagged r's to Z, and the BREI;-r,_ 1 -d toy,. We estimate the constrained system (17) for the 1969:3 to 1976:4 sample period using non-linear least squares and the weighting procedures outlined above. The results are presented in table 1. 15 The coefficient on the unanticipated movements of the bill rate is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, thus indicating that movements in short-term interest rates embody information relevant to the pricing of long-term bonds. Also, as might be expected from the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, the sign of this coefficient is negative, indicating that an unanticipated rise in the bill rate is accompanied by higher long-term rates with a resulting lower bond return. Furthermore, the magnitude of this coefficient is quite close to that found in another study (Mishkin (1978) The theory of the previous section indicates that the (J coefficient estimates should be equal for (18) and ( 19), and the results in table 1 illustrate this conclusion. Even though quite different computer programs (SAS and ESP) were used in estimating ( 18) and ( 19), the (J coefficients were equal for at least four significant digits and often more. In addition, the variance-covariance Three test statistics for rationality and market efficiency are reported in table 2 along with their marginal significance levels: i.e., the probability of obtaining that value of the test statistic or a higher value under the null hypothesis that (J = 0. The W aid test statistic was derived from the variance-covariance matrix of ( 18), the likelihood ratio statistic from the sum of squared residuals of ( 17) and ( 18), and the F-statistic from the estimates of ( 19). Note that all three of these statistics yield similar results as would be expected. None leads to rejection of market efficiency, and indeed the marginal significance levels are quite high. The discussion in the previous section also indicates that the W aid statistic should be [h(n-h) 
6 X (46/45) times the F-statistic derived from (19) , which is what we find in table 2. 1 x
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the econometric properties of a test of cross-equation restrictions developed from the theory of efficient markets. We proved the asymptotic equivalence of this test with the common test of market efficiency which tests for the correlation of .V 1 with past information, Z 1 1 . This result is of interest because it is useful for other applications, as in Abel and Mishkin (1983) , and because it demonstrates that the cross-equation test can be used for inference under quite general conditions: i.e., regardless of the true value of au, and regardless of which past variables are included in Z. We also discuss the need for additional restrictions in order to achieve identification. Finally, the empirical application of the cross-equation test illustrates the results derived in the paper.
IX However, the marginal significance levels are not equal because one is calculated from the F-distribution, while the other is calculated from the chi-squared distribution. Of course, this difference disappears asymptotically. x 2 (6) = 5.635 x 2 (6) = 6.795 F(6, 23) = .960
.465 .340
.527
Note: Margmal Sigmficance Level = the probability of finding that value of the te.st .statistic or higher under the null hypothesis.
Note that both the Wald and likelihood ratio statistics arc distributed onlv asymptotically as x 2 (6).
